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Abstract 
Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We use 
a controlled laboratory experiment to examine how justification can combat profit-seeking 
punishment and promote the legitimacy of punishment. In a one-shot sender-receiver game, an 
independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender has told the truth. 
Most third parties punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave when they can profit 
from punishment. However, majority third parties punish the sender if and only if the sender lies 
when they have to provide explanations for their punishment decisions. Our data also suggests 
that senders are more likely to perceive punishment as legitimate and behave honestly when they 
know the enforcer has to justify their punishment decisions. Our findings suggest that 
justification requirement plays an important role in building efficient punishment institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Justification is widely required in government and other organizations whose decisions can have 
broader consequences for others. Legislators in the European Union are legally obliged to justify 
interventions that affect freedom or property rights. In the United States, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HSS) began requiring health insurance providers to justify 
insurance rate increases of 10% or more in September, 2011.
1
 Doctors need to offer reasons for 
prescribing certain costly medications. In large companies and non-profit organizations, human 
resources must report reasons for hiring and firing employees, and managers need to justify 
employee evaluations. Justification is particularly important in the court system. In a famously 
court case, a former Illinois police officer, Drew Peterson, screamed out his innocence right 
before the verdict, was charged guilty and was sentenced to 38 years in prison for murdering his 
third wife.
2
 In this case, as in many others, the judge needed to offer an explanation along with 
his sentence.   
In view of the pervasive use of justification, it is important to understand how the 
justification requirement affects decision making. This paper presents novel experimental 
evidence that requiring justification could promote the legitimacy of third party punishment and 
curb corrupt punishment behavior.
3
  
Whether punishment is perceived to be legitimate determines how effectively it can signal 
social norms and promote conformity (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006; Xiao, forthcoming), 
Compared with the implicated stakeholders, a third party’s judgment is less likely to be 
influenced by negative emotions such as vengeance and anger (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; 
                                                            
1 See http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/05/20110519a.html. 
2 See http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/peterson-screams-38-years-murder-18563027. 
3 Legitimacy refers to “the degree of consensus about what (people think) is accepted by others, based on norms or 
frames about what is valid and appropriate in given situations (Johnson et al., 2006). In this paper, we assume 
punishment based on norm violations is more legitimate than punishment independent of norm violations. 
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Cubitt et al. 2011; Tan and Xiao, 2012; 2013)
4
. Punishment decisions in modern societies are 
thus usually made and implemented by independent third parties such as the court to ensure their 
legitimacy. 
On the other hand, the legitimacy of punishment is sensitive to the nature of the third party 
mechanism (e.g., Tyran and Feld, 2006; see more papers reviewed in Xiao, forthcoming).  For 
example, when punishment involves depriving violators of resources such as money or labor, 
those resources can become profit for the enforcers. Profit from punishment could motivate third 
party enforcers to impose punishment for their own benefit rather than as a way to maintain 
social order. Such profit-seeking punishment is perhaps most common in corrupt societies. Xiao 
(2013a) shows that when the third party can profit, many of them impose punishment regardless 
of how the recipients behave. Consequently, people no longer perceive punishment as legitimate, 
and punishment fails to signal a norm violation.  
Previous research on punishment, however, has not investigated how the pressure to justify 
imposing punishment may influence the legitimacy of punishment. The effect of justification 
pressure on judgment and decisions has been discussed extensively in the literature on 
accountability, although most of those studies are unable to identify the pure effect of 
justification from other confounding factors such as identifiability.
5
 In his seminal work on 
accountability, Tetlock (1985) argues that people make decisions based on simple heuristics. 
When they are required to justify their actions but do not know audiences’ view, they try to 
anticipate the objections of potential critics. Xiao (2013b) provide experimental evidence that 
                                                            
4 One key feature of an independent third party is that his material payoff is independent of the decisions of the 
implicated stakeholders (see Leibbrandt and Lopez-Perez, 2012). Such categorization distinguishes a third party 
from centralized punishers randomly chosen or elected among the implicated players (e.g., see Baldassarri and 
Grossman, 2011). 
5 
For instance, Vieider (2011, 2012) finds that when people have to explain their decisions to recipients face-to-face, 
they exert more effort or become less loss-averse. One exception is Xiao (2013b) who excludes identifiability and 
examines the pure effect of the external pressure from justification. The author finds that it can reduce selfish 
behavior, even in one-shot environments.  
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pure pressure of justification can enhance the norm salience by encouraging one to think about 
what the audience thinks. As a result, the individual becomes more sensitive to any deviation 
from that expectation. We thus hypothesize that enforcers are more likely to punish consistently 
with social norms when there is justification requirement. Requiring justification can curb 
corrupt punishment behavior and promote legitimate punishment, even when the decisions are 
anonymous and there is no material consequence for poor justification. 
To test our hypothesis, we adopt an experiment based on a sender-receiver game by 
Gneezy (2005) widely used to study cheating behavior. We extend this game by introducing an 
independent third party who could punish the sender after observing whether the sender has sent 
a true or false message to the receiver on which of two options will earn the receiver a higher 
payoff.  
Our experiment is built on the experiment reported in Xiao (2013a). In the baseline non-
profitable punishment treatment (NPP), the punishment decision of the third party is totally 
independent of the decision itself – he only receives a fixed payment for the task. In the 
profitable punishment treatment (PP), the third party earns extra money if he punishes the sender, 
regardless of whether the sender has sent a false message to the receiver. Xiao (2013a) reports 
that people are less likely to view punishment as signaling a norm violation in PP than NPP 
treatment.  In this paper, we introduce a Justification treatment. Compared to PP, the only 
difference in the Justification treatment is that the third party must explain his decision (whether 
to punish or not punish the sender).  
We define legitimate punishment as occurring if and only if a sender violates a truth-telling 
norm. We find that justification increases legitimate punishment to a level similar to the NPP 
treatment. Moreover, compared with the PP treatment, the senders are significantly more likely 
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to tell the truth in the Justification treatment, and the receivers are more likely to perceive 
punishment as signaling a norm violation. These findings support our hypothesis and shed light 
on the underlying mechanisms of the role of justification on legal enforcement and policy 
making.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment design 
and procedure. Section 3 reports the results and Section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The experiment 
2.1 Design 
To provide clean evidence to study how justification promotes legitimate third-party punishment 
decisions, we design our experiment based three one-shot sender-receiver games with the same 
payoff structures first used in Xiao (2013a) (see Table 1).  The instructions are in Appendix A. 
Participants in each game, modified based on Gneezy (2005), play one of the three roles, 
called sender, receiver, or third party.  The receiver must choose between two options, A and B, 
without knowing what the payoffs will be (see Table 1 for the payoffs of each game). Before the 
receiver makes the choice, the sender sends one of the two messages to the receiver. The sender, 
who is fully informed about the monetary payoffs, must tell the receiver either “Option A earns 
you more money than action B” or “Option B earns you more money than action A.” As in 
Gneezy (2005), we designed the payoffs of the two options such that one option yields a higher 
payoff for the sender than the other option. Receivers do not know this is the case. 
       The task of the third party in each game is to decide whether or not to punish the sender after 
observing his message. The punishment reduces sender’s payoff by 50%, depending on the 
choice later by the receiver. Finally, the receiver makes her decision between Options A and B 
after observing the sender’s message and the payoff-cut decisions of the third party. Subjects 
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were not informed of the outcome of each game during the experiment. Thus, the design did not 
allow for learning. At the end of the experiment, one game was randomly chosen as the payoff 
game and each participant will be informed of the result of that game. 
         In our experiment, in addition to senders’ behavior, the third party’s decision can be 
affected by other concerns such as efficiency or inequality between the sender and the receiver.
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We designed our experiment to minimize such confounds. First, we do not inform the third party 
of the sender and receiver payoffs in each game. The only information he knows is whether or 
not the sender has sent a true message. Second, the payoff of the third party is determined by a 
random number from the four numbers in the payoff table with equal probabilities. Moreover, a 
third party learns his earnings only at the end of the experiment. Neither the sender nor the 
receiver knows the earnings of their matched third party throughout the experiment. All these are 
common knowledge to all players in the game. 
Table 1: Payoffs in each game 
Game Option Sender’s payoff Receiver’s payoff 
1 A 10 5 
 B 0 6 
2 A 4 4 
 B 6 2 
3 A 4 8 
 B 8 4 
 
                                                            
6 Previous research finds that decision making is affected by inequality concerns, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), 
Dawes et al., (2007) and Leibbrandt and Lopez-Perez (2012). 
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Our experiment consists of three treatments: non-profitable punishment (NPP), profitable 
punishment (PP), and Justification (J). Data from the first two treatments have been discussed in 
Xiao (2013a). In this paper, we focus on the comparison between the Justification treatment and 
the other two treatments. The sequence of the experiment is exactly identical across treatments 
except for the decisions of third parties. In the NPP treatment, a third party makes his decision 
without any justification and earns a fixed amount of money independent of the decision. In the 
PP treatment, a third party could earn an extra 50% of his random payoff by punishing the sender. 
This is common knowledge for all subjects. 
The Justification treatment differs from the PP treatment only in that after a third party has 
made the punishment decision, he has to provide an explanation for his decision. The message is 
revealed to the other two paired subjects only at the end of the experiment if that game is 
randomly selected to pay out. This means that during the experiment, a receiver could only learn 
the decision of the third party, but not the message. The difference in third party punishment 
behavior between this treatment and that in the PP treatment offers us direct evidence to the 
extent justification decreases illegitimate third-party punishment. 
 
2.2 Procedure 
We conducted our experiment at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory using z-tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 318 students from Carnegie Mellon University and Pittsburgh 
University participate as subjects (one treatment only for each subject). We used 29 groups of 
three in the NPP treatment, 30 groups in the PP treatment, and 37 groups in the Justification 
treatment. 
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At the beginning of an experiment, subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned a 
role and the role was fixed throughout the experiment. To compare the potential different 
reactions of the same third party facing true versus false messages, we let subjects play three 
sender–receiver games with different payoff structures. All sessions begin with Game 1, 
followed by either Game 2 or Game 3 based on a random order to avoid order effects. After the 
end of one game, we randomly rematched the subjects within a session to minimize learning and 
effects from repeated interactions. At the end of the experiment, one game was randomly chosen 
as the payoff round. Each subject was paid privately according to the outcome in that game.  
 
3. Results  
In all sessions we ran Game 1 first. This enabled us to test whether our findings were robust to 
inexperienced subjects. We found that decisions in Game 1 were similar to those in Game 2 and 
Game 3. Hence, we report data pooling from all three games in the following analysis. 
 
3.1 Third-party decisions 
Figure 1 plots the distribution of different types of third parties in all treatments. We sort third 
parties into one of the following categories based on their punishment behavior in three games: 
(1) punish if and only if a sender sends a false message (legitimate punishment); (2) always 
punish regardless of the nature of a message (profit seeking punishment); and (3) exhibit 
punishment behavior that does not fall into either one of the aforementioned categories (others). 
We focus on observations from third parties who have seen both true and false messages.  
As shown in Figure 1, in the NPP treatment, more than 50% (15 out of 27) of third parties 
are legitimate. In the PP treatment, nevertheless, only less than 5% (1 out of 22) of third parties 
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impose legitimate punishment, and the difference is both economically and statistically 
significant (a two-sided Z-test, p<0.01). Most third parties (17 out of 22) always punish the 
sender regardless of the message sent in the PP treatment, but much fewer do so in the NPP 
treatment (6 out of 27, a two-sided Z-test, p<0.01).  
Figure 1. Distributions of third party punishment types by treatment 
 
      Notes: The data include only third parties who experienced both false messages and true messages.  NPP is short 
for the Non-Profitable Punishment treatment in which third parties could not monetarily benefit from punishment. 
PP is short for the Profitable Punishment treatment in which that the third party could benefit from punishment. J is 
short for the Justification treatment, in which third parties must justify their choices to senders and receivers. 
 
       When third parties have to justify their punishment decisions, they are much less likely to 
seek profitable punishment, even though there are no material consequences of justification. In 
the Justification treatment, 56.25% (18 out of 32) of third parties punish if and only if a sender 
sends a false message. This proportion is much higher than in the PP treatment (a two-sided Z-
test, p < 0.01) and is almost identical to the NPP treatment. Compared with PP treatment, 
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significantly fewer third parties in Justification treatment always punish regardless of whether 
the message is true or false (40% vs. 77.27%, a two-sided Z-test, p<0.01).  Although more third 
parties in the Justification treatment always punish than in the NPP treatment (40.63% vs. 
22.22%), the difference is not statistically significant (a two-sided Z-test, p=0.12).  
An overview of the justification messages written by the third parties also suggests that the 
third parties indeed justify their punishment decisions based on norm violations even though all 
the messages and decisions are anonymous and they have the freedom to write anything they 
want. Appendix B lists all messages third parties sent to both senders and receivers in the 
Justification treatment.  
In particular, when asked to explain the decision “why did not punish a sender”, third 
parties predominantly wrote, “since he tells the truth” or “since he did not send the wrong 
message” (32 out of 34). Only one third party wrote “since he lied.”   
When asked to explain “why punished a sender,” over 70% of the time (52 out of 74) third 
parties wrote that “the sender has lied about the message.” About 10% of the answers were the 
opposite, i.e., the sender was punished because he told the truth (8 out of 74). Third parties 
explicitly mention that they could profit from punishment only about 5% of the time (5 out of 
74). These results suggest that, even though the messages are anonymous, third parties seem to 
be averse to providing reasons that others might disapprove.  
 
3.2 Sender Decisions  
Senders’ choice of whether to lie can show us their perception of the legitimacy of punishment.  
Sutter (2009) argues that the definition of deception should depend on the intention to deceive, 
not message sent (i.e., whether the message is the same suggested by a computer). We adopt this 
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and define deception in this paper as any decision that the sender expects to lead the receiver to 
choose the low payoff option. At the end of the experiment, after everyone has decided their 
actions, we elicit senders’ beliefs regarding whether the receivers will follow their messages. 
Thus, lies in our experiment include the cases where a sender sends a false message and expects 
the receiver to follow the message (F_F) and the cases where a sender sends a true message and 
expect the receiver not to follow the message (T_NF).  
If senders expect punishment to be legitimate and believe it is imposed to enforce the norm 
of honesty, senders will send true messages and expect receivers to follow them. On the other 
hand, if senders expect that third party punishment is driven by profit, they will send a false 
message if they believe the receiver will follow the message, or a true message if they believe the 
receiver will not follow the message (see Xiao (2013a) for theoretical analysis in details). 
We report the descriptive data of sender’s decisions and beliefs in Table 3. The right panel 
reports the messages by the senders conditional on their beliefs. The left part of Table 3 
describes the aggregate frequency of lies, which is the sum of F_F and T_NF messages from the 
right panel. Table 3 shows the frequency of lying is approximately 20% higher in the PP than in 
the NPP treatment (55.56% vs. 34.48%). In the Justification treatment, however, the frequency 
of lying drops to almost the same level as in the NPP treatment (34.23% vs. 34.48%). Relative to 
the PP treatment, the frequency of lies is significantly lower in the Justification treatment (55.56% 
vs. 34.23%).   
To provide statistic evidences for the treatment effects, we calculate the percentage of lies 
(T_NF or F_F) for each sender. We find that the justification effect is statistically significant. In 
particular, senders lie significantly less in the Justification treatment than in the PP treatment (38% 
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vs. 50%, a two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.05), and similarly to the NPP treatment (38% vs. 
35.63%, a two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.86). 
Table 3. Senders’ decisions and beliefs by treatment 
Treatment  
(# of obs.) 
Lie  Sender’s decision_ belief     
Freq.  %   Freq.              % 
Non-profitable pun 
(NPP) 
(87) 
 
30 34.48  T_NF 10 11.49 
   F_F 20 22.99 
    T_F 31 35.63 
    F_NF 26 29.89 
Profitable pun (PP) 
(90) 
 
50 55.56  T_NF 36 40.00 
   F_F 14 15.56 
    T_F 18 20.00 
    F_NF 22 24.44 
Justification (J) 
(111) 
 
38 34.24  T_NF 19 17.12 
   F_F 19 17.12 
    T_F 39 35.14 
    F_NF 34 30.63 
Notes:     T_NF: a sender sends a true message and expects the receiver not to follow; 
               F_F: a sender sends a false message and expects the receiver to follow; 
               T_F: a sender sends a true message and expects the receiver to follow; 
               F_NF: a sender sends a false message and expects the receiver not to follow. 
 
 
The results suggest that, senders are more likely to expect punishment to be legitimate and 
less likely to lie when they know that the enforcers are required to provide explanations for their 
decisions.  
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3.3 Receiver decisions 
We summarize receivers’ decisions in Table 4. The descriptive data show that, if the senders are 
not punished by the third party, the receivers predominantly follow the senders’ choices across 
all three treatments. We next focus on treatment effects in cases where punishment is imposed. 
We can infer receivers’ perception of the punishment legitimacy from their decisions on 
whether to follow sender messages when the third party punishes the sender. If receivers expect 
punishment to be legitimate, they should not follow the messages when there is a punishment. 
On the other hand, if they think the punishment decisions of the third parties are profit-oriented 
and hence norm-irrelevant, they will decide whether to follow the message based on their initial 
belief about whether senders will send a true or false message. Thus, the difference in the rate of 
message following when the receiver observes a punishment reflects the difference in the 
receiver’s perception of the legitimacy of punishment. The more likely a receiver views 
punishment as legitimate, the less likely she will follow sender’s message when it is punished 
(see details in Xiao, 2013a). 
In 85.71% (42 out of 49) cases of the NPP treatment, receivers do not follow messages if 
the sender is punished.  By contrast, in the PP treatment, if they observe the third party punishing 
the sender, then receivers make either decision with equal probability (41 decisions follow the 
message, and 40 decisions do not). The Justification requirement recovers the receivers’ 
perception of the punishment’s legitimacy. When the third party punishes the sender in the 
Justification treatment, about 72.60% (53 out of 73 cases) of times receivers do not follow the 
message of the senders, which is a sharp decrease of nearly 25% compared to that in the PP 
treatment.   
14 
 
To compare these percentages statistically, we average out the percentage of decisions 
across three games for each receiver upon receiving a punishment message. We find receivers in 
the Justification treatment are less likely to follow senders’ advice than those in the PP treatment 
(21% vs. 35%, a two-sided Mann–Whitney ranksum test, p < 0.05) when they know that the 
sender is punished. Although the percentage of message following in the Justification treatment 
is still higher than that in the NPP treatment, the difference is no longer statistically significant 
(21% vs. 14.04%, a two-sided Mann-Whitney ranksum test, p=0.11). 
Table 4. Receivers’ decisions by treatment 
Treatment Sender Follow Not follow 
Non-profitable pun (NPP) 
(# of obs=87) 
Punished (49) 7 42 
Not punished (38) 36 2 
Profitable pun (PP) 
(# of obs=90) 
Punished (81) 41 40 
Not punished (9) 7 2 
Justification (J) 
(# of obs=111) 
Punished (73) 20 53 
Not punished (38) 36 2 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
       We study the pure effect of justification on third party punishment decisions using a 
controlled laboratory sender-receiver game experiment. The results support the hypothesis that, 
when punishment is profitable for the enforcers, requiring justification can balance the scale by 
promoting legitimate punishment, even if there are no reputation or material consequences for 
poor justification. This level of balance is comparable to the case where a third party does not 
benefit from punishment. As a result, profitable punishment is more effective in promoting 
honest behavior when justification is required.  
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      The fact that justification promotes legitimate punishment even in the presence of monetary 
temptation can be applied to policy makers, who must explain or justify policy decisions. 
Traditionally, policy explanations are merely perceived as information displayed for the public’s 
benefit. However, the results from our experiment indicate that providing explanations can also 
change the behavior of decision makers in a direction more consistent with the perceived social 
norm. Hence, an obligation to constantly provide justifications to the public could be a low-cost 
way to combat corruption, as a supplement to conventional mechanisms such as punishment. 
       Our results also suggest the importance of designing appropriate compensation packages for 
the law enforcers. Our experiment data clearly support the claim that how law enforcers are paid 
strongly influences the public’s perception of the legitimacy of punishment. As discussed in Xiao 
(forthcoming), the choice between a guaranteed, fixed payment and performance-based payment 
has a tricky trade-off. On the one hand, some scholars have suggested that paying a high salary 
reduces the temptation for law enforcers to earn extra money by exerting their power (Abbink, 
2006). On the other hand, a fixed, guaranteed payment decreases the incentives to convict guilty 
defendants. Performance-based payment can incentivize enforcers to work harder to catch 
violators. However, it also might distort the enforcer’s incentive to convict innocent defendants 
to pursue profit, which could deteriorate the public’s perception of the legal system.  This 
challenge opens avenues for future research, such as comparing the costs and benefits of 
different compensation packages, and evaluating the effect of introducing non-monetary 
incentives. This paper shows that the requirement of justification can be an effective solution to 
build into compensation plans to overcome the dilemma of incentives and promote the 
legitimacy of punishment. 
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Appendix A 
Instructions (Person 1) 
General Information 
Thank you for coming! You’ve earned $5 for showing up on time, and the instructions explain 
how you can make decisions and earn more money. So please read these instructions carefully! 
There should be no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
Each participant is in the role of either Person 1, or Person 2, or Person 3. You are in the role of 
Person 1.  
This session consists of three rounds. At the beginning of each round, the computer will 
randomly group one Person 1 with one Person 2 and one Person 3. Thus, your counterpart in 
each round will change randomly throughout the experiment. No one will ever be informed of 
the identity of the two counterparts.  
Below are the decision tasks in each round 
In each round, two possible monetary payments are available to Person 1 and Person 2 in the 
experiment. 
The two payment options are: 
Option A: $W to Person 1 and $X to Person 2;              
Option B: $Y to Person 1 and $Z to Person 2 
 
The payoff structure of Option A and Option B will be different in each round.   Only Person 1 
will know the exact values of  W, X, Y, and Z in each round.  Neither Person 2 nor Person 3 will 
know those values in any round.  The computer will randomly assign W,X, Y,  or Z , with equal 
chance, as Person 3’s payoff. 
 
 Person 2’s decision: In each round, Person 2 will decide to choose either Option A or 
Option B and thus decide the payoffs of Person 1 and Person 2.   
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 Person 1’s decision: In each round, Person 1 needs to decide which one of the following 
messages to send to Person 2 before Person 2 decides which option to choose.  
Message A: “Option A will earn you more money than option B.”; 
Message B: “Option B will earn you more money than option A.” 
 Person 3’s decision: Person 3 will NOT know the exact values of W, X, Y, and Z but 
will know whether the message sent by the matched Person 1 in each of the three rounds 
is true. (Note: Since the payoff structure of Option A and Option B changes from one 
round to another, which message is true in each round will also change accordingly.)  
After Person 1 decides which message to send to Person 2, Person 3 decides whether to 
assign a payoff-cut to Person 1.  
 
(the Profitable Punishment and the Justification treatments) 
If Person 3 assigns the payoff-cut, Person 1’s payoff (decided by the option Person 2 chooses) is 
cut by 50% and Person 3’s payoff is increased by 50%. 
 
If Person 3 does not assign the payoff-cut, Person 1’s payoff is not reduced by any amount and 
Person 3’s payoff is not increased by any amount. Person 2’s payoff will not change no matter 
what decision Person 3 makes. There is no cost for Person 3 to assign the payoff cut. Person 3 
will make his/her decision prior to knowing his/her randomly assigned payoff. 
 
(the justification treatment) 
After Person 3 has made the payoff cut decision, he/she must write a message to explain why 
he/she decided to do so. The explanation must be related to Person 1’s behavior. Any message 
written in a round will be sent to and reviewed by Person 1 and Person 2 at the end of the 
experiment only if that round is randomly selected as the payoff round (details below).    
 
Important: Person 3 will forfeit all earnings from the experiment and receive only the show up 
bonus if he/she did not write a message to explain his/her decision or the explanation is not 
written in the required format as explained below. Person 3 should not identify him or herself by 
name or ID number or gender or appearance. Violations will also result in Person 3 receiving 
only the $5 show-up bonus.  In particular: 
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 If Person 3 assigned the payoff cut, the message should be written in the following 
format: 
“Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 …” 
 If Person 3 did not assign the payoff cut, the message should be written in the following 
format: 
“Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1…” 
 
After Person 1’s and Person 3’s decisions, Person 2 sees the decisions of both Person 1 and 
Person 3, and decides whether to choose Option A or Option B. (Note: neither Person 2 nor 
Person 1 will see Person 3’s message at this point).  
 
For example: 
Suppose, in one period, Person 1 sent a message and Person 3 decided to impose the payoff-cut. 
Person 2 then decided to choose Option B. The random payoff assigned to Person 3 turns out to 
be $X. 
Person 1’s payoff in that period = Y-0.5*Y  
Person 2’s payoff in that period= Z 
Person 3’s payoff in that period =X+0.5*X 
Suppose, in one period, Person 1 sent a message and Person 3 decided NOT to impose the 
payoff-cut. Person 2 then decided to choose Option B. The random payoff assigned to Person 3 
turns out to be$X. 
Person 1’s payoff in that period = Y 
Person 2’s payoff in that period = Z 
Person 3’s payoff in that period =X 
 
After Person 2’s decision, a new round starts.  Each participant will be randomly paired with 
another two participants.  Each round will proceed in the same way.  
 
You will not know the result of each round during the experiment. In the end of the experiment, 
one round will be randomly chosen to be your payoff round. Every participant will be informed 
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of the result of that round.  Both Person 1 and Person 2 will also see Person 3’s message that 
explains his/her decision. Each participant will be paid accordingly.  
 
To repeat the key parts of this experiment, Person 1 and Person 2 will earn the amounts specified 
in the option chosen by Person 2. However, Person 2 will never know what amounts were 
actually offered in the option not chosen (that is, he or she will never know whether Person 1’s 
message was true or not). Moreover, Person 2 will never know the amounts to be paid to Person 
1 according to the different options. Also, Person 2 and Person 1 will never know what payoff 
Person 3 randomly received. Person 1’s earnings will also be affected by Person 3’s payoff-cut 
decision. Person 3’s earning will be increased if he/she assigns the payoff-cut to Person 1.  
Person 3 must write a message to explain his/her decision and the explanation must be related to 
Person 1’s behavior. The message will be viewed by Person 1 and Person 2 at the end of the 
experiment only if that round is randomly chosen to be the payoff round. Person 3 will lose all 
earnings from the experiment and receive only the show up bonus if he/she did not write a 
message to explain her/his decision or if the explanation is not written in the required format.  
 
Your ID________ 
The next several pages outline the procedure of the experiment and the computer screens 
when Person 1, Person 2 and Person 3 make their decisions.  
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Appendix B 
We asked the subjects in the role of third parties write a message to explain their decisions. We 
pool all the answers (three by each third party) from the three games and put them into three 
categories: reasons about why they punish the sender, why they do not punish and other 
unidentifiable reasons. Despite that we discourage empty messages, there are three occasions 
that subjects did not provide any explanations. Therefore, the total number of messages is 108.  
 
Reasons why the sender should be punished (74): 
Reason 1: Person 1 lied to person 2 (52): 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because they sent the Message A which is 
not true. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied about which message 
was true. 
 Person 1 should receive the payoff cut because Person 1 was not honest in their answer. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 chose the not true option 
and that should disqualify them from earning more than person 2. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did not act truthfully. 
Person 1 gave Person 2 incorrect information. 
 Person 1 should receive the payoff cut because Person 1 was not honest in their answer. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the pay cut because person 1 chose the not true option and 
that detract from the overall group’s earnings. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned payoff cut because person 1 has sent message A which 
is not true. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent an untrue message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 sent a message which is 
untrue. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a message to Person 2 
that was not true. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 chose the message that is 
not true even though person 1 knew the message was not true.  
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a false message to 
Person 2. This is deceitful, and there are negative consequences for such actions. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent an untrue message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent an untrue message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 could be lying to person 2 
in order to get more money for themselves. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 lied.  
 Person1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did not tell the truth. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent out the untrue 
message.  
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1, while presumably acting 
in his/her own self-interest, has given person 2 false information. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Person 2 an untrue 
message that cause Person 2 to believe they would receive more money when they 
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wouldn't.  
 Person one should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent an untrue message 
to Person 2 that would cause person two to believe they would receive more money 
when they would not. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 has given Person 2 false 
information. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied about which message 
was true. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Person 2 a message 
that was untrue which may cause person 2 to believe they would receive more money 
when they wouldn't. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a false message to 
Person 2. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 didn't tell the truth. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff-cut because they considered their own fiscal 
well-being over Person 2 by lying about the better option, so I considered my own gain 
over theirs. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message A which is 
not true. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a message to Person 2 
that was not true instead of sending the message that was true. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied to Person 2. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied to Person 2. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message A to Person 
2, which was a false statement. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 was not truthful. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied to Person 2. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did not send the true 
message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person one was dishonest. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did not send a true 
message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied to Person 2. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did not send a true 
message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 was dishonest. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did not send a true 
message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 was not truthful. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message A to Person 
2, which was a false statement. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 lied to person 2 about 
which option was better. 
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 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 lied. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 might not be telling the 
truth. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 lied to Person 2 in order to 
earn more money for himself. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message A to Person 
2, which was a false statement. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 lied. 
 
 
Reason 2: The sender sent a true message (8): 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 choose message A and it 
was true. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a true message to 
Person 2 when a false message could have benefitted Person 1 more than a true 
message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 choose message A which 
is true. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a true message to 
Person 2 when a false message could have benefitted Person 1 more than a true 
message. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff-cut because Person 1 probably chose to send the 
message that would result in them making more money. Because of this, it is okay for 
them to receive a payoff-cut since he/she will already make enough money compared to 
Person 2, and perhaps Person 3, as well. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 was honest. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent the correct statement, 
which he probably believes that Person 2 will perceive as false and hence earn himself 
a higher pay in the end. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a true message to 
Person 2, even though he probably thinks that Person 2 will not believe him. Therefore, 
by sending the true message, Person 1 believes that Person 2 will choose the opposite 
message and hence earn Person 1 more money. 
 
Reason 3: The third party could earn more (5): 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 chooses message b where 
I can be assigned a higher payoff. 
 Person 3 has the opportunity to gain an additional 50% on their earnings, making it the 
logical option for person 3 to choose. 
 Person 1 should be assigned payoff cut because person 1's payoff will be decreased by 
50% which make mine's payoff increased by 50%. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 has shown that he/she 
does not mind acting in the best interest of others; thus he/she will not object to Person 
3's best interest. 
 Person 1 should be assigned a payoff cut because Person 1 will give Person 3 more 
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money this way. 
 
Reason 4: Others/unidentifiable reasons (9): 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 stands to lose 50% of their 
earnings. 
 Person 1 should receive the payoff cut because Person 1 was not acting in their best 
economic interest. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 chose an option that lost 
themselves money. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because they sent Message A.  
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message A. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 was not crafty enough 
with his/her decision. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message A to Person 
2. 
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 should make the least 
amount of money.  
 Person 1 should be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message A. 
 
 
 
Explanations why the sender should not be punished (34): 
Reason 1: The sender sent a truthful message (32): 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a truthful message 
to Person 2, in order for Person 2 to base a decision on. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent a truthful message 
to Person 2. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message A which 
was true. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did not lie about which 
option is greater.  
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent Message B which 
was true. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent the message that 
was true. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because person 1 decided to send the 
message which is true. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 was honest and sent 
the truthful message to Person 2. Therefore, he/she should be assigned the amount they 
deserve, without a payoff-cut. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent the true message. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent the truthful 
message. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did NOT lie. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent out the true 
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message.  
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 did NOT lie.  
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent an accurate and 
truthful message to Person 2 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 told the truth. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 told the truth. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff because Person 1 told the truth to person 2 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 told the truth. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent the true message. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because he/she is correct 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 should be telling the 
truth about which option to pick. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 is correct. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the pay-off cut, because they did what was best for 
everyone in the group and didn't lie about which option was better. 
 Person 1 will not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 is correct. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 told the truth. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 told the truth. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent the true message. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 sent the true message 
to person 2 and in fact told person 2 which one would make him more money. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 told the truth. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 told the truth. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 didn't lie. 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 send a message to 
Person 2 that was true and that would result in Person 2 making more money. 
 
Reason 2: The sender has told the truth (1) 
 Person 1 should not be assigned the payoff cut because Person 1 chose Message A 
which is untrue. 
Reason 3: Unclear of the game (1) 
 I did not assign the payoff cut because I don’t even get what’s going on in this 
experiment. 
 
